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 10.1 Introduction 
 While, in Europe and beyond, decisions about children who lack competence 
to contribute to their treatment decisions are based upon their best interests, 
both the European Court of  Human Rights and bioethical theorists consider 
that there must be substantial involvement of  parents in these decisions. In 
the United Kingdom (UK), legal and clinical guidelines say that critically ill 
children’s best interests must be agreed by their parents and doctors, or the 
courts, in a process of  shared decision-making. There is widespread accep-
tance that there should be limitations on parental authority in shared deci-
sions, yet parental authority is ill-defined, and without some agreement on 
the source of  parental authority it is difficult to limit it either cogently or 
consistently. 
 This chapter presents results from an empirical ethics investigation into 
shared decision-making in the paediatric intensive care unit, a study that 
focused on critical decisions in which an infant child’s treatment or non-
treatment would be decided. While many of  the parents involved expressed 
their views about their child’s best interests as an intuition, this intuition was 
generally based on their knowledge, emotional intimacy and close proxim-
ity to their child. However, in some circumstances such intuition appeared 
to have no basis in fact or experience, and this was notably the case for 
the intuitions parents said they would rely upon to make critical decisions 
about treatment at the end of  life. A combination of  knowledge, emotional 
connection, intimacy and intuition also saw many parents actively contribute 
to decision-making and frequently request treatments for their child. I use 
intuition here to characterise an instinctive sense that something is the case – 
what is sometimes termed a ‘gut instinct’.  1  Normative accounts of  intuition, 
which I will discuss in this chapter, are divided about the basis and the value 
of  intuitions, but not the definition; as McMahan puts it, moral intuition is a 
‘spontaneous moral judgement’ (2000: 93). 
 The study results allow us to glimpse a rich picture of  the sources of  
parental authority, and thus offer the cogent reasons we need in order to 
place consistent limits on the scope of  parental authority in shared decisions. 
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I contend that parental authority can have a basis in intuition, which should 
be based upon tangible, intimate knowledge of  their child, their child’s 
therapy and their child’s medical history; however I suggest that, without 
this basis, parental intuition alone should not be authoritative. I accept that 
requests for treatment may communicate such knowledge and thus be useful 
for raising the quality of  care. However, I observe that such requests may also 
have a deleterious effect on other children within the clinical setting because 
of  the physical limitations of  resources and the varying abilities of  parents as 
advocates. For these reasons, while I argue there are strong reasons to involve 
in decisions about their children parents who are (in ways I explore) close to 
their offspring, I suggest there are defensible, definable and consistent limits 
to the exercise of  parental authority in shared decisions. 
 10.2 Parental authority in practice 
 Parents are widely considered to share decision-making authority with cli-
nicians (Sullivan, Monagle and Gillam, 2014), all the more so in decisions 
about infants who are unable to express their own wishes. In the UK, clinical 
guidelines, including those from the General Medical Council (2010), the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2007) and the Royal College of  Paediatrics 
and Child Health (2004), suggest a parent-clinician partnership to serve the 
child’s best interests. This clinical partnership is also recognised in common 
law in the leading case of   Re J (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [1991] Fam 
33, in which Lord Donaldson MR (at 41) characterised a parent’s ability to 
refuse or consent to their child’s treatment as part of  a system of  checks and 
balances on doctors or the courts. 
 There is, however, widespread agreement that there should be some lim-
its to parental authority. For instance, parents have no authority to demand 
treatment under English law (Munby, 2013). Yet even this relatively clear 
legal boundary to parental authority relies on the best interests principle, 
which has been widely argued to be vague and indefinable (Bellieni and 
Buonocore, 2009; Baines, 2010). Clinical guidelines limit clinicians’ authority 
to objective medical knowledge: for instance, the General Medical Council 
(2010: 47) says: ‘You must not rely on your personal values when making 
best interests decisions [or] make judgements based on poorly informed or 
unfounded assumptions about the impact of  a disability on a child’. How-
ever, guidelines suggest no similar boundaries to parental authority. Bioethi-
cists like Schoeman have advocated for increased parental authority while 
limiting that authority by reference to somewhat platitudinous criteria, such 
as cases in which the child will come to ‘extreme, irremediable and obvious 
harm’ (Schoeman, 1985: 52). Others, such as Bailey (2001), have suggested 
that families’ input ought to be based on subjective values because they act 
as a proxy for the subjective preferences of  their relative. However, even if  
accepted without argument, such a criterion provides no scope for differen-
tiating acceptable from unacceptable values. Moreover, by suggesting that, in 
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the case of  newborn babies, parents ‘are often best placed to know what is in 
the interests of  their child because of  their closeness to him or her and the 
special bond that they enjoy’, guidelines from the Nuffield Council on Bio-
ethics (2007: 23) arguably suggest that parents’ knowledge of  their infant is 
intrinsic and intuitive – exceptionally difficult criteria on which to offer limits. 
 What all of  the preceding criteria share is a failure to articulate clearly con-
sistent boundaries to parental authority which can be applied in practice. The 
results from empirical ethics research into this issue, which I now present, 
suggest that to conceive parental knowledge as intrinsic or innately subjective 
fails to capture the rich and informative nature of  this knowledge. While par-
ents do claim intuitive knowledge of  their infant’s interests in critical medical 
situations, this is often based upon tangible factors. These factors, while not 
being entirely determinative, offer a platform from which to more clearly 
reflect on both the scope of  parental authority and the limits we should place 
on our expectations of  it in shared decision-making. 
 10.3 The BIPIC study 
 While European empirical studies have contributed to knowledge of  a wide 
range of  issues salient to the current topic, including the degree to which 
parental authority is determinative of  children’s treatment (Hagen et al., 
2012) and the effect on parental wellbeing of  sharing decisions (Caeymaex 
et al., 2013), the content of  parental contributions to shared decisions is 
rarely examined (a rare example is a single case study from de Vos et al., 
2015). Judging Best Interests in Paediatric Intensive Care (BIPIC) is a qualita-
tive empirical ethics study funded by a Wellcome Trust Fellowship in Society 
and Ethics (grant number WT097725FR), which investigates the values and 
experiences of  decision-makers in the paediatric intensive care unit, and thus 
examines parental contributions to decisions in detail. 
 10.3.1 Methodology 
 The study used a qualitative empirical ethics methodology  2  consisting of  
an empirical component followed by a process of  reflective equilibrium, in 
which the empirical data was reconciled with ethical theory. The method 
of  reflective equilibrium broadly followed that postulated by Daniels (1979). 
The empirical research drew participants from the four decision-making 
groups identified in guidelines from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (2007), 
namely doctors, nurses, members of  clinical ethics committees and parents. 
Only parent interviews are considered in this chapter, although their obser-
vations are corroborated by other groups. Parents were recruited through 
three paediatric intensive care units (PICU) and took part in in-depth face-to-
face interviews about their experiences. Not all parents had direct experience 
of  making a critical, life-or-death decision, although all had vivid memo-
ries of  their child’s critical illness and their own experiences relating to this. 
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Table 10.1 Parent recruitment
Study Site Approached Responded Consented Interviewed Total
Site 1 71 11 8 8 14
Site 2 40 3 3 3
Site 3 20 3 3 3
Participants continued to be recruited and interviews conducted until no new 
themes emerged. 
 10.3.2 Recruitment method 
 The study was reviewed and approved by a local research ethics committee. 
To ensure the researcher had no access to confidential data, a senior clinician 
in each intensive care unit identified potential parent participants from clinical 
records. Parents were eligible to take part if  their child had been a critically 
ill inpatient between one and two years prior to recruitment. Their child had 
to conform to the following criteria at the time of  their admission: Paediat-
ric Intensive Care Society critical illness level two or above (i.e. one or more 
organs supported); less than four years old or otherwise unable to contribute 
to decisions about their care; and a PICU stay of  more than four days. Eligible 
parents were contacted by a letter from the senior clinician, and responded 
directly to the researcher if  they were interested in participating. Parents were 
purposively recruited to reflect the range of  outcomes expected nationally 
from a PICU admission, thus about 10 per cent had experienced a bereave-
ment and another 30 per cent had children with ongoing morbidity. 
 10.3.3 Recruitment results 
 A total of  131 parents were approached by letter, of  whom 17 responded 
and 14 subsequently took part in an interview ( Table 10.1 ). 
 Parents were interviewed alone or in couples at a private location of  their 
choosing, depending on their preference. Two parents brought friends or 
relatives to the interview for support, rather than a spouse. Parents provided 
written consent and were assigned code numbers to preserve their anonym-
ity. Details of  participant characteristics are given in  Table 10.2 . 
 10.3.4 Data collection 
 Interviews were semi-structured and followed a topic guide that was for-
mulated from a literature review at the beginning of  the project. Questions 
were modified as the study progressed in order to iteratively explore themes 
that emerged in prior interviews. Open questions encouraged participants to 
tell their story, and follow-up questions explored the experiences, values and 
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Table 10.2 Characteristics of  BIPIC parent participants
Interview Present at interview Length of  admission Outcome of  admissiona
40 Both parents 210 daysb Ongoing morbidity
41 Both parents 61 daysb Death
42 Mother and relative 4 days Death
45 Both parents 16 days Ongoing morbidity
55 Mother 14 daysc Recovery
56 Both parents 5 days Recovery
58 Mother 10 days Ongoing morbidity
59 Both parents 4 days Ongoing morbidity
60 Mother 12 days Recovery
61 Mother 9 days Ongoing morbidity
62 Mother 10 days Recovery
63 Mother and friend 7 days Recovery
64 Mother 5 days Recovery
65 Both parents 10 days Recovery
a Recovery is where child leaves PICU with an improvement in their admission baseline health, Ongoing 
morbidity is where the child leaves PICU with a deficit to their pre-admission baseline health.
b Includes time on ward due to multiple readmissions to PICU during hospital stay.
c Duration of  ward plus PICU stay as times were unclear in the interview.
beliefs that underlay the participant’s interpretations of  children’s best inter-
ests. Interviews lasted between 73 and 180 minutes. All participants agreed to 
have their interviews audio recorded. 
 10.3.5 Analysis 
 Interview recordings were transcribed by a professional transcriber. The 
transcripts were anonymised to remove identifying names and locations 
before being analysed, using thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
This method was selected because it was iterative and did not require 
parents to participate in repeated interviews about a sensitive and poten-
tially distressing topic. The analysis involved coding the interview data to 
identify key words, phrases and topics that participants used to express 
their experiences and beliefs. By analysing codes across all parent inter-
views, key themes emerged that offered insights into the parental role in 
decision-making. 
 10.4 Key findings 
 Parent participants (hereafter referred to simply as ‘parents’) felt they had a spe-
cial understanding of  their child’s physiological and behavioural norms, as well 
as substantial clinical knowledge and expertise in their child’s clinical history 
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and clinical condition. Such understanding often took the form of  an intuitive 
sense of  the child’s wellbeing, which apparently rested on this expertise and 
proximity. Where critical end-of-life decisions needed to be taken, most parents 
also thought that they would intuitively know what the right thing to do would 
be. Parents’ knowledge and intuition also provided a platform from which to 
request treatments and advocate for their child; these requests included chang-
ing treatments, ensuring interventions were undertaken as planned and other-
wise attempting to improve the quality of  their child’s care. 
 10.4.1 Parents’ knowledge of  their child 
 Parents recalled intuitive feelings of  unease at the onset of  their child’s acute 
illness or if  their child’s clinical condition deteriorated. These feelings were 
driven by their knowledge of  their child’s normal appearance and behaviours, 
which resulted from a constant close proximity to their child. In a typical 
example, P41 describes becoming aware of  her baby’s sudden deterioration 
following an initial discharge from PICU: 
 P41 (MOTHER): And I had not been apart from my baby ever, and I knew 
him, and I knew every colour on his face and every look that he gave 
me and every movement that he made, I knew it. So the minute that 
something changed, I knew it. 
 Parents also felt that their close proximity to their child throughout the 
hospital admission gave them a firm narrative of  their child’s medical history, 
and that this was sometimes more accurate than that of  their doctors and 
nurses. For instance, one parent, by being present at shift changes, was both 
able to learn the clinical details and to correct mistakes or omissions in the 
clinical history. Others were familiar with earlier treatments or procedures 
and queried the accuracy of  documentation: 
 P40 (MOTHER): You’ve been in hospital with your child for several months, 
and you’ve seen like day in, day – 24 hours a day, you know what 
they’ve done. Like sometimes things might get written down, abbre-
viated to like what actually happened and you’ll be like, ‘Hang on a 
minute, that’s not exactly what happened. This is what happened.’ 
 This ability to keep an accurate narrative history was noted particularly 
where there were gaps in the medical narrative, such as when care was shared 
between more than one institution or where, as in the case of  P59, the child 
had a long-term condition that was rarely seen by medical trainees: 
 P59 (FATHER): . . . not so much the regular nurses, but doctors that we don’t 
see before, they’re always asking us, because at the end of  the day we 
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know more about her and her diagnosis than most of  the doctors up 
there. It’s only really the specialist for her that knows more than us. 
 Parents also brought a very particular perceptual knowledge of  their child 
as an individual. While this sentiment was more often implied than expressed, 
P45, whose child had a relatively common congenital disability, was con-
cerned this depersonalised her child to some clinicians: 
 P45 (MOTHER): . . . because she’s got [congenital condition] um she’s 
treated in the same sort of  way [as other infants with that condition]. 
So like well [certain symptoms] can be explained away because she’s 
got [congenital condition], and you don’t want that: you want them 
still to assess her as her and make sure that they don’t make excuses 
or let things happen just because of  that. 
 Parents were therefore able to bring a wide range of  knowledge and con-
nection with their child to discussions with healthcare professionals. More-
over, parents also related the ways they used this knowledge to advocate for 
particular directions to be taken in their child’s treatment. 
 10.4.2 Parents’ requests for treatment 
 Parents’ knowledge of  their child’s medical norms and history meant they 
were able to interact with healthcare professionals to broaden and improve 
the medical narrative. Moreover, parents frequently intervened in their child’s 
care and made requests for treatment. Examples included requesting extra 
laboratory tests on blood samples to match tests taken on prior occasions, 
challenging the method of  a proposed surgery or, in this example, requesting 
that staff  combine x-rays in order to reduce x-ray exposure: 
 P65 (MOTHER): He was having some x-rays and they wanted to do two 
x-rays. I did question them and said, ‘Why do you need to do two? 
Can you not just do one?’ In the end, they just did one. But a big-
ger one. Because they wanted to take one of  one area and one of  
another area. I said, ‘Surely, he’s only little, you can fit it into one,’ 
and they did. I didn’t want him to have more than he really needed. 
 Very often, these interjections were to remind staff  of  an intervention the 
parent had expected them to initiate, such as commencing their child’s feed 
or complying with infection control measures. An example of  this is P55’s 
request that a central venous catheter be removed in line with local infection 
control policy, which she had discovered on the hospital’s public website: 
 P55 (MOTHER): A femoral line, he still had that in, and they came to take 
that out. ’Cos I complained, I said, ‘He’s not meant to have that in 
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there is he, after a certain amount of  time?’ And they said, ‘Oh OK, 
we’ll take that out,’ you know, ’cos I knew you’re not meant to have 
that in [from looking at the internet]. 
 This data gives insights into tangible contributions parents made to the 
care of  their child, and moreover shows these parents’ requests for treatment 
could be based on competent assessments of  technical criteria. However, 
there was one further strong driver of  decision-making: intuition. 
 10.4.3 Intuitive knowledge 
 Some parents suggested their knowledge of  what was best for their child 
was intuitive, and found it hard to believe that they would be able to act in a 
way that was contrary to their intuition. P61 talked of  a ‘gut feeling’ that had 
played a role in her recognition that her child was becoming seriously ill, and 
because of  this she felt parents would instinctively know when treatment was 
no longer in their child’s best interests: 
 P61 (MOTHER): I had that gut feeling, I knew [my child] wasn’t right. It 
wasn’t just a bug. It wasn’t just give him [paracetamol] and [ibupro-
fen] and lots of  fluid, and see how he was. That [. . .] morning was – 
he was lying on my bed – you knew there was something wrong. I 
suppose, maybe, as a parent, when you get to that point, again, you 
know that, yes, this is the end of  the line. There’s nothing more that 
can be done. No matter how hard it is, maybe you do that, that does 
kick in. 
 This projection of  intuitive knowledge of  their child from a situation they 
had experienced to an instance they had not was repeated by other parents; 
for example, P59, the mother of  a life-limited child, said: 
 P59 (MOTHER): I just think parents know the child’s best interests. I don’t 
think it even needs to take a doctor to say that. What kind of  parent 
would put their child through something they didn’t feel that they 
had to be put? No parent would. I think you just know. 
 Thus, while intuition was often underwritten by experiential knowledge of  
the child, this foundation caused parents to give credence to intuitions about 
more suppositional situations. 
 10.5 Discussion 
 Emergent themes from parent interviews suggest that parents’ day-to-day 
intimacy with their child furnishes them with a practical knowledge of  
their child’s wellbeing, which can be employed in a variety of  clinical and 
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non-clinical situations. This knowledge can be applied in clinical scenarios 
and at times can compete with clinicians’ specialist knowledge. Practical 
knowledge gives parents a sense of  intuition about their child’s wellbeing, 
and this intuition can extend beyond familiar situations, for instance engen-
dering the conviction that they will know the best interests of  their child in 
a critical decision about treatment or non-treatment. Knowledge of  their 
child as an individual may also provide a heightened degree of  emotional 
sympathy, and, further, drive parents to request treatments that they consider 
to be in the child’s interests. The interviews thus offer significant insights 
into the complex role of  parents in the shared decision-making process, and 
allow some conclusions to be drawn. These conclusions focus particularly 
upon infants whose wishes and values, should they exist, we have no way of  
knowing. 
 The way parental knowledge is gathered suggests that a parent’s intimacy 
with their child is profoundly important to their ability to contribute to a 
shared decision, an idea which has formed the mainstay of  a number of  
influential theories of  family authority. In the remainder of  this chapter I 
shall use this information to set out some limits to parental authority. I will 
argue that it is parents’ intimacy with their child which gives them familiar-
ity with their child’s medical course and this offers a credible basis for their 
role in the decision-making process. Such a basis, however, also implies a 
limitation where intimacy and familiarity are absent. While parents may form 
strong intuitions about their child’s wellbeing, which, when driven by experi-
ence, are likely to be well-founded, intuitions that are not driven by experience 
(such as, often, decisions about whether treatment or non-treatment is in 
the child’s interests) are of  less practical value and must be viewed more 
cautiously in the decision-making process. While this implies a restriction, 
parental involvement in critical decisions may also be important because of  
the focus parents bring upon the child as an individual. Where a child suf-
fers a common condition that may lead clinicians to depersonalise the child, 
parents’ emotional sympathy may bring the focus back on to the individual 
and combat this depersonalisation. Finally, parents are strong advocates for 
their child and often request treatments. This phenomenon is particularly 
interesting, because it both highlights a reason for involving parents in shared 
decisions and a reason for limiting their authority, perhaps highlighting the 
difference between a ‘request’ and a ‘demand’. This is because even valid 
requests for treatment may be a mechanism for raising the quality of  care for 
their child, while conversely reducing equitability for those with less powerful 
advocates. Let us consider these conclusions in more detail. 
 10.5.1 Intimacy and knowledge 
 A parent’s intimacy with, and proximity to, their child throughout their lives 
may lead to a detailed knowledge of  their child’s development and clinical his-
tory. Close proximity may also mean that parents develop a grasp of  clinical 
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facts about their child that is comparable to (or potentially greater than) that 
of  attending clinicians. Constant presence at the child’s bedside provides par-
ents with a narrative that can be more coherent than a clinician who sees 
the child episodically due to the provision of  their speciality, the fragmented 
nature of  shift systems and so on. These observations suggest that intimacy 
is a key component in a parent’s ability to contribute to decisions. 
 The importance of  intimacy in parental decisions resonates with Hegel’s 
theory that families are a unique and intimate community characterised by 
love (Hegel, 1851/1976: 110). Hegel argued that parents have a duty to 
imbue in their children a sense of  individuality and self-worth, since this 
sense of  individuality will lay the foundation for moral autonomy (Blustein, 
1982: 90–95). In a similar position, Ross (1998: 20–38) and others (Schoe-
man, 1985; Downie and Randall, 1997; Erickson, 2010) have argued that 
parental authority in decision-making is drawn from the intimate nature of  
families. This intimacy distinguishes them from other collections of  individu-
als since they know each other best, share each other’s goals, their wellbeing 
is intertwined and the boundary between the interests of  their members is 
blurred. For Ross, these interconnected interests mean that families should 
make unfettered decisions about their members, and controversial decisions 
such as those based on the quality of  a child’s life should remain within the 
family’s ambit. Other thinkers argue that parental authority in medical deci-
sions rests upon parents’ exposure to grief  (McHaffie, 2001:393–415) or the 
burden of  care they will carry if  their child has a disability (Harrison, 2008). 
While they may have merit, because these arguments rest on reducing bur-
dens for the parents rather than the child, they are inherently controversial. 
 Other theorists are wary of  involving parents in decisions. For instance, 
Dare (2009) contends that parental perceptions of  best interests may be mis-
taken, and that mere possession of  a beneficent motivation does not single 
parents out from doctors or other well-motivated carers; indeed, as Archard 
(2004: 137–149) observes, it is dangerous to assume parental beneficence. 
Dare also suggests that parental knowledge may be plausible in some circum-
stances, but that the family has no intrinsic knowledge of  the needs or moti-
vations of  an infant, nor does the burden of  care which falls upon families 
reasonably entitle them to disregard medical facts and likely prognoses. 
 Responses from BIPIC give us a lens through which to consider these the-
oretical contributions. It seems that Ross is correct to identify the importance 
of  intimacy to parental decision-making, however, this is not because parents 
share the child’s interests, but because intimacy is a source of  knowledge 
about (and, as I will consider later, emotional connection with) children’s 
best interests. The value of  this claim rests on important presumptions. The 
first is that the parent is actually an intimate with their child; clearly a par-
ent who has had little contact with their child (such as an absent father) will 
have no intimate knowledge. Secondly, the parent must be competent to both 
remember and report the clinical narrative. This will often be the case but, 
as parents have a range of  abilities, there will be instances where parents will 
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not be able to meet the intellectual or emotional demands that this involves. 
However, assuming these caveats are met, intimacy, and especially intimate 
knowledge, is a credible criterion on which to found parental authority in 
shared decision-making. 
 10.5.2 Intuition 
 In BIPIC, intimacy also gave parents a strong sense of  intuition about their 
child’s best interests, and the contributions to shared decisions that parents 
reported relied strongly upon their intuitions. In many cases these intuitions 
were derived from their intimacy with their children, and the knowledge 
that this gave rise to. Thus parents were used to the way their child looked 
and behaved when they were well, and this drove their intuitions that their 
child was becoming sick. Crediting this type of  ‘gut feeling’ with author-
ity seems reasonable, since it is based on the knowledge that will be gained 
from close association. But parental intuitions were not limited to areas about 
which they had intimate knowledge. Intuitions about whether treatment or 
non-treatment was in the best interests of  their infant were not based upon 
parents’ past knowledge of  their child; and infants could not have communi-
cated their wishes about the length and intensity of  efforts to continue their 
lives, even if  they had had such thoughts. 
 In these circumstances it is helpful to consider how intuitions have been 
perceived in moral philosophy. In metaethics, the study of  the nature of  
right and wrong, intuition has been considered at length. G.E. Moore (1903) 
regarded intuition as the only way of   directly appreciating what is fundamen-
tally morally right (in other words, we could not find secondary reasons for 
moral approval without also possessing an intuition); a century later, Audi 
(1998) wrote that intuition was epistemically equal to inference in detecting 
fundamental moral principles. Yet, in the realm of  clinical ethics, since we 
are uncertain about what is fundamentally morally right, moral intuitions are 
given less status than in metaethics, being seen instead as playing a part in 
moral behaviour, without alone being regarded as sufficient to make moral 
decisions. Such a view is espoused by McMahan (2000), who does not disre-
gard intuitions (since he believes they may harbour deeply important beliefs 
that are essential to humanity), yet he rejects the idea that intuitions alone 
can provide moral answers. McMahan instead argues that moral intuitions 
are important because they offer us somewhere to start our moral inquiries. 
Our intuitions let us take a guess at the correct answer, from which we can 
try to reason using the knowledge, observations and arguments at our dis-
posal. I therefore contend that parental intuitions about critical treatment 
decisions may lead to the discovery of  important, hitherto unarticulated, rea-
sons that may influence the final decision. Such intuitions should prompt 
further inquiry. Yet these intuitions cannot form the sole basis on which to 
continue or discontinue treatment. Knowledge, rather than intuition, must be 
the bedrock of  parental authority. 
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 Intuition does, however, have a further role to play. As I noted above, par-
ents are not just a source of  knowledge about their infant, but also a source 
of  intuitive emotional connection. A parent who appreciates their child as an 
individual is expressing a fundamental tenet of  parenthood. While this may 
have no bearing on the validity of  their opinions, it may nevertheless be an 
important reason for involving families in decision-making. In the emotiv-
ist ethical framework of  David Hume (1998/1751), emotional sympathies, 
rather than rationality and argumentation, are the  source of  moral feeling. 
Hume argued that, while rationality can provide us with moral answers, it 
is emotional sympathy that gives us the moral questions – for example, it is 
because we emotionally value human life that bioethics debates how to pro-
mote this value.  3  In practice this means a parent’s intimate emotional connec-
tion to their infant may make them emotional catalysts who can ensure that 
‘rational’ clinicians focus on what is valuable about the infant. For instance, 
parents may draw attention to the value of  their child when clinicians have 
submerged that concern in a multitude of  others, or have written off  a child 
as a ‘futile’ case. Thus parents may offer an antidote to prejudice, emotional 
fatigue or overwork amongst staff. Because this emotional sympathy does 
not need to be informed, while a powerful reason for considering parents’ 
views about the child’s treatment, it should not represent grounds for paren-
tal authority on its own. 
 10.5.3 Requests for treatment 
 Parental intimacy, knowledge, intuition and emotional connection come 
together when parents request treatments in the belief  that they will improve 
the quality of  their child’s care. Parents may fight for what they perceive as 
the interests of  their child with stamina that exceeds any other party. A par-
ent, as a child’s advocate, can literally demand the attention of  doctors and 
nurses, and such behaviour may advance their child’s care in a way that will 
be effective in a large, busy hospital. For instance, a clinician may be encour-
aged to give extra pain relief, to expedite an important test result or to seek 
a second opinion, where these steps may otherwise not be undertaken. This 
is an important consideration, for if  we wish to do what is best for chil-
dren, a strong advocate is an important asset. Thus, while English law tells us 
parental  demands are not determinative, some, perhaps many, parent  requests 
for treatment actively improve the quality of  their child’s care, an undeniably 
important role. 
 The benefits of  these requests must be tempered with a recognition that 
advocacy is a two-edged sword. Parents may also request treatments that 
work  against the benefit of  the child and are at best a distraction, and at worst 
impede clinicians from doing their best for the child. Even if  we assume such 
instances are rare and the usual outcome of  a treatment request is to do good 
to the child concerned, parental inclination is to maximise their own child’s 
opportunity, which may clash with another important clinical motive, that of  
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treating patients equitably. This equitability is based on inherent limitations 
of  resources, such as the finite time clinicians have to spend at the patient’s 
bedside. Parents who demand a larger share of  these resources for their child 
deprive others whose parents are quieter or less effective at making their 
case, not to mention those children who have no parent to advocate for 
them. Although this phenomenon has not been studied in a hospital setting, 
a recent review offers compelling evidence that articulate, middle-class public 
service users are adept at vocalising and advancing their needs (Matthews and 
Hastings, 2013).  4  This underlines international evidence from primary care 
settings indicating that patients from wealthier, more articulate social groups 
receive longer consultations (Deveugele et al., 2002; Furler et al., 2002; Mer-
cer and Watt, 2007). Although not directly analogous to the sort of  micro-
allocation that takes place between patients at the ward level, there are clear 
parallels. 
 There is thus a mixed picture of  the effects of  parental requests for treat-
ment which adds more nuance to the legal position, and helps us tease out 
the difference between a  demand and a  request for treatment. Some additional 
perspective can be gained by considering phenomena related to the family 
more generally. Rawls (1971/1999) argued that, since families vary in wealth 
and ability and are motivated to use what resources they possess to benefit 
their children, they are basic drivers against social equality. Such observations 
go back at least as far as Plato’s  Republic and have led to utopian experiments 
with collectivised child-rearing in various modern societies, such as Maoist 
China, Israel and Soviet Russia (Archard, 2004: 213–215). Because of  this 
patchy history, Blustein (1982: 212–214 and passim) concludes that we must 
respond to Rawls’ critique, yet we have no convincing model that improves 
upon the family itself  as a nurturing environment for children. Instead, if  
we wish to benefit children at large, individual families must be restrained in 
their ability to advantage their members. These observations are important 
because they clarify the basic conflict between a parental desire to benefit 
their child and the clinician’s desire to offer care fairly and equitably. Parental 
requests for treatment as a means of  achieving a good quality of  care must 
therefore be divided from a presumptive right of  families to benefit their 
child at disproportionate cost to others, and the latter, which we could label 
treatment  demands , should be beyond the limits of  family authority. 
 10.6 Conclusion 
 Throughout Europe, decisions about children, and in particular children who 
lack the capacity to express their wishes, are made in their best interests. These 
are broadly conceived as arising from a shared decision between doctors and 
parents, but, while clinical roles in a shared decision are clearly defined, the 
scope of  parental authority in shared decision-making is ill-defined. This is 
equally true of  bioethical accounts and, in the UK at least, clinical guidelines 
and the law. Clinical guidance in some cases appears to consider parental 
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input to be based on intrinsic knowledge of  the child’s best interests, while 
bioethical accounts lack detailed or consistent criteria for placing limitations 
on parental authority. Even the lack of  authority to demand treatment within 
the law lacks clarity since it relies on the vagaries of  the best interest test. 
 Interviews with parents about their own contributions to shared decisions 
reveal contributions in several related areas. Parents’ intimacy with their child 
may make them sensitive to their child’s health and behavioural norms. Their 
close proximity to their child throughout their clinical stay may give them 
access to an unbroken clinical narrative, and their emotional intimacy may 
lead them to communicate the unique value of  their child to others. This 
intimacy may be felt as an intuition, although parents may also have strong 
intuitions in areas where they have no underlying experience. Proximity, inti-
macy and intuition may also make parents powerful advocates for their child’s 
cause, requesting treatments to improve the quality of  their child’s care and 
making sure their interests are heard by clinicians amongst the demands of  
others. 
 Such contributions provide powerful reasons to include parents in shared 
decisions, but they also give us criteria to demarcate some consistent limits 
to parental authority: Parents must have intimate contact with their child and 
the capacity to use this knowledge. Parental intuitions that are grounded in 
intimacy and knowledge appear more authoritative than those ungrounded 
intuitions that are more suppositional. We must be wary of  giving both types 
of  intuition the same status, and when parents are in new and unfamiliar situ-
ations their intuitions may represent the beginning rather than the end of  a 
moral inquiry. Parental requests for treatment are in many cases reasonable 
and likely to benefit their child, yet the authority of  these requests must be 
bound by reference to the needs of  others. Articulate parents must not be 
afforded benefits for their children to the detriment of  others with less effec-
tive advocates. 
 While offering robust theoretical criteria, the scope of  parental author-
ity offered here is intended to help guide consistency and transparency in 
practical cases. While shared decision-making between doctors and parents 
represents a significant area of  consensus, we risk inconsistency if  we share 
decisions without inquiring into why parental views may be authoritative. By 
analysing the contributions that parents make to shared decisions in practice, 
we can bring clarity to an area where authority is too often assumed to be 
self-evident. 
 Notes 
 1 The quotation in the title is from the character Joe Cabot in the 1992 film  Reservoir Dogs (dir. 
Tarantino). 
 2 The degree to which empirical data should cause the re-evaluation of  normative theory is a 
controversial topic in bioethics. Although I, along with many others, suggest empirical data 
makes a valid contribution to these problems, I shall leave it to others, such as de Vries and 
van Leeuwen (2010), to make these arguments. 
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 3 Such arguments are gaining renewed traction through social intuitionist explanations of  
the psychological sources of  moral thinking (Haidt, 2001), which suggests our thought 
processes produce intuitive moral judgements before we embark on rational moral 
reasoning. 
 4 It is notable that this review suggests there is no evidence that articulate parents and fami-
lies create broader uplift of  standards from which there is a more general benefit, as is 
sometimes claimed. 
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